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-A review of the literature on pre-colonial sanctions among 
the diverse indigenous cultures of North America has tested the 
analytic skills of more than one scholar, so di verse were the 
cultures in which the subject is found. A characteristic of many 
so-called primitive cultures was the extremely sophisticated 
means by which matters legal were melded and integrated into 
other societal functions requiring little or no independent 
superstructure that stands apart to mete out punishment. Put 
another way, when leaders, councils or Indian police emerged as 
significant agents of sanction, it was likely that a failure in 
the underlying, self-sustaining fabric of the society was the 
reason for the emergence of a legal system which seemingly stood 
apart. 
Social control and the attendant sanctions for deviance from 
norms embedded in indigenous society are remniscent of the large 
portion of an iceberg which remains hidden from public view and 
even from legal ethnographers. How else might one explain the 
characterization of Northern Eskimo societies by the brilliant 
scholar E. Adamson Hoebel as examples of "primitive anarchy?" 
Eskimo societies, hunting and gathering groups which depended 
little, if at all, upon jural figures and institutions, offer a 
good starting point for examination of indigenous sanctions 
because of the absence of judges or police and their near total 
dependence on individual inculcation of social norms appropriate 
to the membership of the group. 
In nearly every indigenous society children were carefully 
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prepared for membership in a society which looked to kin and 
allies to teach and restrain - to effectively be lawgivers and 
the agents of punishment - subject to constraints upon interven­
tion in another person's behavior. 
Through a process of child rearing which made a child acutely 
sensitive to subtle cues from other persons and very sensitive to 
teasing, ridicule and ostracism as child and as adult, Eskimo 
children were taught the limits of correct behavior. As in other 
societies young men lived apart in men's houses and sweat baths 
and were counseled in groups. This indirect mode of instruction 
and correction made all the more serious, later, more pointed 
teasing or ridicule. 
Other themes that suggest precursors to forms and manner in 
which secular punishment occurred existed within this subtle 
society. So many and complex were rules against taboo violation 
that few persons could avoid breaking one or two. Eskimo society 
had shamen fully prepared to draw upon spiritual forces to repair 
damage done or to punish ordinary persons as they chose. 
Confession and contrition were the only logical responses to a 
process of supernatural sanctions which, whether secularized in 
the hands of shamen or others, were clearly beyond avoidance and 
beyond mortal control. 
As a society dependent upon individual response to subtle 
cues, the watchword of personal behavior was to avoid involvement 
in interpersonal conflict at all costs unless one could get away 
with it. Only bullies or those with extraordinary supernatural 
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or physical power could be less subtle in their interpersonal 
activity. Yet, however guarded in one's interaction with others, 
mistakes were bound to occur. Ultimate protection was therefore 
impossible, as impossible as diligent avoidance of taboo viola­
tion. That one would be punished, for unexcused wrongs whether 
intentional or not, was more likely than not. That one sould be 
prepared to punish transgressors and manifest this capacity was 
not only a personal safeguard but what later commentators might 
refer to as a civic virtue, a fundamental condition of group mem­
bership. 
No less an authority on American Indian law than Wilcomb E. 
Washburn finds retributive justice as central to the concept of 
Indian law (1975). He writes, "Revenge was the form in which 
Indian justice was most often expressed. It was a noble passion, 
and an all-consuming one. A wrong had to be repaid, and it 
usually was, though it took years of patient effort to accomplish 
it (17)." 
Of course, Washburn is not entirely correct. In Eskimo 
society as in others many wrongs were redefined as non-wrongs as 
a way to avoid the duty of retribution, a duty shared (or 
imposed) on others as well. Still, his point is central to our 
analysis of pre-state tribal societies in North America because 
it provides a clue to the social meaning of receiving and meting 
out punishment. 
To prepare for retaliation to lesser or greater social 
infractions was a hallmark of one's membership in the group and 
. 
not merely a reflection upon one's personal honor. A ci vie 
responsibility reserved for public officials and public institu­
tions in later societies was privatized and delegated back to kin 
groups, hunting alliances and other smaller units of the society 
in all but a select series of instances where the entire group 
was threatened by treachery, witchcraft or persons clearly 
endangering the group. 
The social roots of retribution connect directly to the 
interdependence of indigenous societies and their subunits. 
Retribution connects directly to reciprocity as a positive social 
force within indigenous groups. Reciprocity is built upon the 
systematic construction of debts and obligations among group mem­
bers. For a subunit to be called upon to retaliate, one must 
demonstrate persistent loyalty to it whether that loyalty is 
formed through hunting and gathering family ties or blood feuds. 
Retribution in Eskimo and many other societies took the form 
of taking a life of equal status in the off ender's group. In 
Eskimo groups a blood feud triggered by revenge set in motion a 
cycle of episodic violence that had no determined end at least 
until Western intervention plucked violent aggressors from the 
Eskimo's midst and labeled them "murderers" ( Hippler and Conn, 
19 7 3) . Washburn terms the League of the Iroquois as a con­
federation formed to put to rest blood feuds among tribal sub­
uni ts (1975:136). 
Concern that strangers to the group were persons imbued with 
an obligation to retaliate for near-forgotten wrongs strengthened 
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individual and group resolve to dispatch strangers or flee them 
(Spencer, 1959). So, also, did fear of retaliation for one's own 
wrong or that of one's group heighten anxiety and cause persons 
to react preemptively to threats real or imagined. Finally, it 
may be that the intra-group anxiety was turned outward by groups 
to nonmember groups in warfare. 
While examples of each of these negative influences of 
retributive justice suggest how the duty to punish can be 
destructive to groups both internally and in their external rela­
tionships, more must be said about the positive and integrative 
forces of that same impulse. 
Revenge as a socially acceptable form of punishment was 
reined in by several attributes of indigenous social control. In 
many societies compensation to the kin or allies of victims took 
the place of intra-group violence. Among Navajo Indians, for 
example, where injury to property or persons was established 
without concern for fault or guilt of the perpetrator, compen­
sation was negotiated between clan groups. Drawing into play 
one's group in a dispute deepened one's own future obligations. 
In groups where leaders emerged beyond clan subunits and in times 
of peace, their political roles were usually that of consensus 
builders and not of dictators. Each of these social traits seems 
to have been influenced by the core impulse of revenge as a 
socailly acceptable form of punishment. 
Returning to the Eskimo example, one discovers other influ­
ences of the powerful outward reaching momentum of revenge on 
sanctions within the Eskimo scheme of social control. Hoebel has 
written of song duels and other contests between would-be antago­
nists. Such contests had the obvious result of ventilating and 
concluding disputes short of interpersonal violence. Yet when 
the jibes associated with losing a song duel are coupled with the 
more pervasive role of teasing, gossip and ostracism, a clearer 
relationship to the duty of revenge emerges. These latter pun-
ishments put into question the offender's status in the group. 
These subtle forms of non-intervention in a society which 
questions all intervention as to its legitimacy even as it 
questions misconduct, create distance from an individual and 
those he hopes will protect him in future encounters. 
Mentioned above was the tendency to overlook offenses or to 
redefine them as non-offenses (e.g., wife-stealing as wife-
lending, theft as borrowing). Along with these traits, a more 
common approach in indigenous law systems is to treat interper­
sonal disputes at the lowest possible social level. Public 
transgressions were limited to the exceptional matter and often 
cast as religious violations. Individuals subject to public exe­
cution or banishment had disconnected themselves from the group 
by systematic rejection of group norms and subgroup ties. They 
had become strangers. 
To become an outcast, whether banished or not, was (short of 
execution) an ultimate punishment for members of indigenous 
groups. Loss of membership and loss of the shared obligations 
attendant to retributive justice were very much the same thing. 
This noble and all-consuming passion of which Washburn wrote 
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flows not from barbaric impulse but from the same impulse which 
reduces most legal process in indigenous society to something 
other than guilt-discovering procedure. To evoke retribution or 
to confess and seek the punishment which the group deems 
appropriate is to test one's membership in the group. Whether 
off ender or off ended, one's status in the group was defined by 
punishment deemed socially appropriate. 
To employ the Northern Eskimo pre-contact legal process as 
the basis upon which to explore the less visible realm of North 
American indigenous law may seem inappropriate. However, the 
underlying rationale of this non-system, an iceberg with no tip, 
offers the viewer an opportunity to understand the less visible 
portion of many other systems. Punishment in all systems are 
indications of the success or failure of private attempts at 
conflict avoidance and group preservation. In fact, the process 
of private conflict avoidance and adjustment that forms "the eti­
quette of the setting" gives over to the public setting only 
those matters which it cannot contain. Even then, the logic of 
the hidden system colors the activities which are private, just 
as that same logic has filtered into tribal justice in post­
colonial settings. Let us test this proposition against commen­
tary on North American tribes. If we return to child rearing we 
find that parents, though party to corporal punishment, may sub­
mit to being whipped themselves or even shield the child from 
blows (Driver, 1961:459). This does not mean that children are 
not whipped. What is relevant is that parents pass over to more 
remote relatives the task or raise in children the threat of the 
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supernatural. Ridicule also plays a part in nearly every society 
as an inducement to perform according to expectation (Driver, 
1961:462). Yet personal criticism in public by one's immediate 
family was infrequent. Rather, the family "presented a united 
front to the outside and sought to protect and defend their mem­
bers rather than ridicule them" (Driver, 1961:463). 
Blood feuds were expected between family units and not within 
them. Whether the sanction was opportunistic revenge as in the 
Arctic, Plateau and Plains or the compensation in the Northwest 
and select areas of the Plains states, the expectation was not of 
brother killing brother. (See Reid, 1970:86.) 
Offenses against property were generally considered private. 
These included sexual offenses as women were considered property 
in many indigenous groups. Their mutilation by aggrieved hus­
bands was an oft-mentioned sanction. Unless one compares 
scratching of children to snipping away of noses, mutilation of 
errant women marks a rare departure in sanctions meted out to 
tribal members. Physical torture was usually reserved for pris­
oners from other tribes, e.g., strangers. Among Northwest tribes 
persons might be sent into debt servitude, but, unlike enslave­
ment of prisoners, it was possible to buy one's relative out of 
enslavement. 
To connect privatized legal process with development of a 
public superstructure and most importantly to explain the pre­
colonial impetus for such structures is difficult given the 
quality of data available. Equally difficult is a precise divi-
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sion between public and private offenses. To know the legal 
reaction to a particular offense one generally must know the 
exact situation in which the offense occurred, its practical con­
sequences (the range of endangerment), the social status of the 
offenders and the community's expectations of them. Age, sex, 
clan affiliation and past behavior were all determinates not only 
of the sanction imposed, but also of the legal level in which the 
sanction was imposed. Indigenous justice was personalized as 
might be expected in tribal societies. The norms imposed were 
not abstractions unless experience had shown that they empiri­
cally impaired individual and group survival. Usually acts were 
measured against their ascertainable consequences that impaired 
property rights and group relationships. 
This said, one can make crude divisions as did W.W. Hill in 
his ethnographic account of the Santa Clara Pueblo (edited by 
Lange, 1982) between "personal or private law" and so-called 
major crimes as to sanction and legal level. Hill determined 
that deviance which primarily concerned individuals such as 
"various types of assault, malicious gossip, nagging, slovenli­
ness, lewdness, adultery, fornication, drunkenness and conflicts 
involving damages and ownership" (Lange, 1982) was dealt within 
families or subunits while behavior deemed offensive to super­
natural entities or failure to participate in community work 
projects were matters appropriate for public resolution. Yet 
personal crimes in one context may be deemed public in another. 
As Driver notes in his analysis of pueblo life, theft, 
adultery and even homicide were considered "torts" or private 
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matters which did not reach the council "unless they became too 
violent to be handled by the proper officials" (Driver, 1961: 
338). In those instances, one can suggest that the offender had 
by his act set in motion a social process which threatened the 
well-being of the group. The Ojibway and Micmac reportedly had 
formal trials which structured negotiations between the friends 
and relatives of a deceased person over compensation in lieu of 
immediate public execution of the murderer (Wissaler, 1957:179). 
Among Apache and Navajo negotiations over serious offenses such 
as murder, witchcraft and adultery were held before headmen, but 
imposition of execution (if determined) was left to the victim's 
clan (Vicenti, 1972). 
The Iroquois tried witches before a formal council but left 
murderers to the revenge of immediate families unless a peace 
token was accepted (Wissler, 1957:181). 
These examples suggest that the need to draw into play the 
highest level of public authority may at times have related to 
the severity of the sanction: for some, execution by represent­
atives of the entire society; for others, banishment to certain 
death (as in the Arctic) or for a period of years (as among 
Plains tribes). Imposition or at least enunciation of the sanc­
tion by the corporate tribe has the benefit of putting to rest 
blood feuds by removing their inner logic. This conclusion is 
bolstered by examples of tribal rituals among Southeastern and 
Plains tribes which afford amnesty, e.g., sun dance, green corn 
dance, to participants. As in the case of the song duel, putting 
to rest the crime among indigenous subgroups seems to have been a 
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fundamental role for supraclan legal authorities. 
Of course, involvement of the larger indigenous unit where 
the individual is deemed a witch, in violation of supernatural 
edicts (as in Southwestern Pueblos) or clearly "crazy" and unfit 
for continued co-existence with the Eskimo group, allows for 
family and allies to put distance between themselves and the 
miscreant even as it allows the community to rid itself of a 
threat to its very existence. These serious cases appear to be 
the antithesis of the normal role of political authority of 
indigenous groups: to harmonize internal antagonisms and to con­
firm the authority of group subunits in the adjustment of 
conflict, but they are in fact a very logical outcome of that 
same process. The normal goal of most correctional process in 
indigenous societies is to reintegrate the offender back into the 
community. Heretics, witches and those who have repeatedly 
violated tribal norms are exceptional persons who cannot be rein­
tegrated. 
One other rationale for public authorities must be explored. 
Police or soldier societies among Plains tribes meted out punish­
ments ranging from beatings and destruction of property to 
banishment and even execution when other penalties failed to 
reform the offender (Hoebel, 1960:52). 
Does the existence of these tribal police and their activi­
ties refute or confirm what I have suggested is normally a system 
of privatized dispute avoidance and adjustment? Does it suggest 
a different role for public authority among Plains tribes? 
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A review of the literature (Provinse in Eggan, 1937:339-374) 
suggests that police societies are a logical outgrowth of the 
more typical indigenous system of law and sanction. Selected 
warriors dealt primarily with occurrences in tribal activities 
which were public, for example, in restraint of fellow warriors 
on war parties and on buffalo hunts. They also intervened in 
intratribal disputes during those seasons when the tribe came 
together for some common purpose (Id:348). Thus, order-keeping 
was connected to specific events and circumstances. When those 
circumstances ended, authority to act returned to kin groups when 
theft, murder, or assault occurred. 
Provinse reports that punishments inflicted by police among 
the Plains tribes were uniform: 
Whipping or clubbing was the most frequent measure 
resorted to, followed up in more serious cases by 
destruction of the culprit's personal property - his 
tipi, blankets, gun, bow, horses, etc. Infrequently, in 
the case of particularly stubborn individual, the death 
penalty was inflicted . . .  (Provinse, 1937:349). 
The context of these punishments suggests that police 
societies were well-integrated into the logic of tribal order 
keeping. The intent of sanctions with the single exception of 
execution was to induce reform on the off ender. Argument and 
feasts preceded restraints on warriors. Immediate evidence of 
contrition and promises to behave resulted in tribal acceptance 
of the offender (Provinse, 350). McNickle recounts a case 
studied by Llewellyn and Hoebel of a member of the Southern 
Cheyenne who was set upon, beaten and left abandoned after per­
sistent disrespect and horse thievery. After coming upon members 
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of the Northern band he confessed his bad conduct, promised to 
reform and became ultimately a member of its soldier society 
(McNickle, 1975:56-57). Even Plains Indians banished as a result 
of repeated killings ritualistically return to their tribe and, 
with appropriate contrition, are reintegrated into it. 
The heightened role of police societies as an instrument of 
tribal law during events that draw together tribal subunits or 
that unleash youthful passions does not seem to withdraw from 
tribal subunits and tribal chiefs their ultimate responsibility 
for dispute processing. Rather, their emergence seems appropri­
ate as to time and place. The punishments they mete out are also 
calculated to the sequence of persuasion deemed central to plains 
justice. 
Community activities in other societies generate mutations in 
their law process. For example, when engaged in whaling, Eskimos 
who are normally immune from intervention by structured leader­
ship fall under the control of the umalik or whaling captain. In 
short, the police societies are a logical extension of indigenous 
social control. 
When we evaluate the role of private and public sanctions in 
indigenous societies we often discover that public and private 
wrongs are intertwined. Thus, sanctions must address both con-
cerns. 
Northern Athabascan villages offer a good example of the 
interlocking phenomenon which offers us an oportunity to under-
stand punishment in indigenous societies. These groups, made up 
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of several small matrilineal family bands of hunters and gather­
ers in Interior Alaska were studied by me and Dr. Art Hippler 
less than seventy-five years after white contact (Hippler and 
Conn, 1972). 
Village chiefs were chosen by lineage heads on the basis of 
their reputation for considering the entire group. They were 
never precipitate in their judgments. Disputes heard by the 
chief were only the most serious, those which might require 
severe sanctions. Yet, to mete out these sanctions, the chief 
depended upon adroit use of conciliatory techniques to mold 
village opinion, especially the opinions of other villagers 
respected as leaders within his lineage. 
If an off ender were called before village authorities both 
public and private implications of his conduct were addressed. 
First, his need to be reconciled with the village through acts 
that demonstrated his sorrow for his deeds that had potentially 
damaged the balance between lineages in the community. Second, 
he had to make amends to the victim and his kin for the wrong 
committed. 
Demanded, then, of both the chief and the offender were great 
powers of persuasion. Although guilt was a foregone conclusion 
by his very appearance before the chief, his contrition would 
determine whether or on what terms he would be reconciled. Here, 
as in other societies, one observed a second role for ridicule 
and stigmatization, now institutionalized to mark and punish an 
offender. 
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Adultery was viewed as serious because it could lead to 
violence that in turn could strain the fabric of mutual obliga­
tions and repsonsibilities that tied together not only kin 
groups, but communities. 
For adultery to be brought to the chief and his council was 
itself a form of sanction as it brought shame on the offending 
matriline for ignoring what could lead to a dangerous situation. 
When the guilty individuals appeared, they were expected to con-
fess. If they refused at yet a second meeting, their clothing 
was torn from them by the council and the offended spouses who 
were called into the second meeting to bring down additional 
pressure. If the parties admitted their guilt, the offending 
husband would be ordered to remunerate the offended husband. The 
offended husband was then permitted to give a formal warning to 
the adulterer that if the act were repeated, he would kill the 
offender. 
The impact of this formal warning made before the chief and 
his council was to create immunity for the offended husband if he 
killed. No revenge could be taken for this death. Even if he 
were an important man, the offender's relatives would get a very 
small death payment. If a child had been born to the woman, her 
husband could also obtain compensation. 
Theft was also treated in a manner which had an impact on the 
thief's matriline as well as the thief. If the thief admitted 
his guilt, he repaid what he had taken plus an additional sum. 
His matriline was not expected to assist in the payment and, in 
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fact, had a vested interest in seeing that it was paid to put 
down antagonisms between the kin groups. 
If, however, the thief could show mitigating circumstances 
such as hunger or great need, his matriline would be shamed into 
assisting in the payment of his fine. 
If the thief did not repent or denied his guilt and could 
show no mitigating circumstances, he might be banished for 
several years and fined. Chronic recidivists were banished for 
life. They could be killed if seen without fear of retaliation. 
Murder was the most serious of crimes and could be punished 
by death. The chief either had to persuade the kinsmen of the 
victim, the likely complainants, to accept a death payment from 
the killer, or persuade the kinsmen of the killer to accept the 
death sentence. If the matriline of the victim accepted the 
death payment, the matter ended. A death payment was usually 
accepted if it was felt that the victim had provoked the attack, 
or the victim had been of less importance than his killer. Of 
concern to the chief and council as well as the victim's matri­
line was the size of the killer's matriline. Even if it accepted 
the death penalty, it could remain angry at the victim's matri­
line. This could affect mutual expectations and obligations. If 
the death penalty was demanded and accepted with concurrence by 
the chief and council, an executioner would be appointed. If the 
murderer fled, he could be killed without fear of retaliation. 
If an influential man killed a person of similar importance, 
the process, both private and public, was put into danger. The 
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offended matriline would not accept a death payment and the 
offending matriline would not accept a death penalty. This 
forced a further stage in the deliberative process. If the 
offender and his victim were from different bands as well as dif­
ferent clans, the off ended matriline would contact all major 
family heads from surrounding villages. The issue would be not 
merely the private killing but whether clans should join in war 
against the offending clans. Here war sometimes did occur. In 
other instances protracted discussions allowed tempers to cool 
and some less onerous remedy to be found. 
This rather lengthy description of the interrelationship 
between private acts and their consequences to clans and even 
villages, drawn from my field work and that of Dr. Hippler, 
offers the viewer more than the two-dimensional view of sanctions 
and indigenous legal process that most reviewers provide us. 
We see that crimes in the indigenous context have profound 
implications for the subgroups of the tribal society if they are 
articulated and brought forward for a public airing. Deeper 
implications emerge than the impact of a punishment on the 
offender and his victim, implications that lead beyond the ini­
tiation of a blood feud to the very disintegration of the group. 
The role of leaders in order maintenance and renewal of 
interpersonal relations becomes better understood as the deci­
sions made are elucidated. The indigenous groups could not 
tolerate free floating aggression whether by its own instruments 
of punishment or by offenders. Subgroups could better afford to 
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forget about offenses than to pursue them to their limit. 
Ridicule or other techniques for ventilation of anger avoided the 
imbalances created by the very process which meted out justice. 
Although this paper is a general report on the role of 
punishment in pre-colonial North America, there must be some 
focus on the damage done to sophisticated indigenous law ways by 
contact with Western society. That damage has been extreme. 
We have seen that childhood socialization and family control 
play an important role in teaching members of the group how to 
behave, to be responsive to the cues and signals emanating from 
other persons and groups. This aspect of indigenous law ways was 
poisoned and destroyed by alcohol abuse in many indigenous 
societies. With alcohol came the social belief widely accepted 
that one who was intoxicated was temporarily insane and not 
responsible for his drunken comportment. Intoxication became a 
convenient excuse for unbridled aggression. Law systems which 
depended upon reeducation with or without further punishment 
could not adapt to this phenomenon. Alcohol and not the rational 
being was said to be to blame. 
A second aspect of post-colonial justice was the tendency of 
nearly every law system to become more centralized as it engaged 
non-indigenous society. Chiefs and leaders who were no more than 
derivative compromise seekers were looked upon through Western 
eyes as leaders who could command without deliberation. 
Authority to deal with deviance at the lowest possible unit of 
tribal society was removed from these subunits. Indigenous 
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justice became less proactive and preventative in its focus and 
more like that of Western society. These changes did not occur 
overnight. Many tribal legal systems, even those imposed upon 
tribes in the form of Indian courts, tribal councils and Indian 
police, demonstrate in their day-to-day functioning appreciation 
for the role of family subunits and the impact of a punishment on 
the society's integrity. Yet, this said, the future does not 
promise a similar appreciation for the logic of law and punish­
ment. As older judges and councilmen resign to be replaced with 
fully acculturated Native Americans, each society loses its ties 
with its own legal culture. 
The sophisticated law ways of indigenous groups in North 
America is slowly displaced but not replaced by mutated forms of 
Western law and punishment. 
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